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ARTICLES

PLANTATION LULLABIES: HOW FOURTH
AMENDMENT POLICING VIOLATES THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS TO PARENT*
LENESE HERBERT**

"A society that does not protect its adults cannot protect its
children."1

* This title is borrowed from the compact disc, ME'SHELL NDEGEOCELLO, PLANTATION
LULLABIES (Maverick Records 1993).
** Special thanks to the organizers and attendees of the 2004 Northeast People of
Color Conference; Professor Sanjay K. Chhablani, Syracuse University School of Law
(who read the seminal draft of this paper and gave substantive invaluable comments);
Professor Darren Hutchinson, American University, Washington College of Law;
Professor Leonard Baynes, St. John's University School of Law; Jocelyn Cuffee, Western
New England College School of Law; and Kimberly Nickelson Tarver, Esq. This article is
dedicated to my beloved nieces and nephews: Christopher Herbert, Lacey Herbert, Bria
Herbert, and Brandon Herbert.
1 Maria Grahn-Farley, A Child Perspective on the Juvenile Justice System, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 297, 299 (2002) (stating that the child is put in a weaker position
than the adult through legal and social practices).
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INTRODUCTION.
Lullabies, dulcet melodies becalm and promise comfort, safety,
and security midst their stanzas and refrain.
Peaceful,
restorative slumber is the goal; relaxation is a prerequisite. The
child, recipient of such calming energy, is rendered impervious to
her worldly woes, eventually succumbing to the potent emotional
elixir of security within a parent's care. Infants, children, and
adolescents rely upon adults to comfort and nurture them.
Protection is, of course, paramount.
However, when the lyrics ring false and the singer is exposed
as impotent, the child is.forever changed, scornful of the parent's
fraud. The child, whose healthy development and growth are
often inextricably tied to the understanding of parental
omnipotence, is, at best, forever changed and, at worst,
destroyed. Parental clay feet, cracked and exposed, reveal adult
inability that, in turn, breeds childhood instability. She can no
longer trust her parent, nor her fundamental ordering and
understanding of The Universe. Heretofore omnipotent parents
become pretenders to the throne, charlatans utterly incapable of
providing protection promised in the well-meaning, yet
unforgivable lies.
Chaos ensues, raging without and, more
tragically, within the disillusioned child. The situation is fraught
with risk; deft handling is required.
Innocence may be
irretrievably lost; parental authority may be stripped of any
worthy or admirable meaning.
The Constitution presumes that "fit parents act in the best
interests of their children." 2 This presumption "contemplates
that a parent will act for the child in situations in which the child
lacks the capacity or judgment that may be required." 3 Parents,
driven to protect their children,4 are keenly aware that childhood

2 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (explaining that parents possess what
children lack in maturity).
3 See Melodie Pilitire, Comment, Grandparent Visitation Rights: The Pitfalls and the
Promise, 2 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 192 (2001) (discussing natural bonds of affection
between parent and child).
4 T. BERRY BRAZELTON, M.D., & JOSHUA D. SPARROW, M.D., TOUCHPOINTS: THREE TO
SIX: YOUR CHILD'S EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL DEVELOPMENT 349 (Perseus Publishing
Co. 2001) (discussing milestones of child development).
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"is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
5
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage:"
[T]he right of parents to raise their children as they think
best, free of coercive intervention, comports as well with each
child's biological and psychological need for unthreatened
and unbroken continuity of care by his parents. No other
animal is for so long a time after birth in so helpless a state
that its survival depends upon continuous nurture by an
adult. Although breaking or weakening the ties to the
responsible and responsive adults may have different
consequences for children of different ages, there is little
doubt that such breaches in the familial bond will be
detrimental to a child's well-being. But so long as a family is
intact, the young child feels parental authority is lodged in a
unified body 6which is a safe and reliable guide for later
identification.
If parental management of a child's social identity is subverted
or violated, the harm is rarely overstated. Those who have
succeeded in deracinating parental authority (necessary for
rearing children) and childhood innocence, without parental
permission, consultation, or guidance, are guilty of violating a
fundamental tenet of American individualism and selfdetermination and perhaps a basic tenet of human rights.
When that violator is an agent of the government, that agent
has not only compromised the integrity and health of a parent's
child, but also the parent's right to rear his child in the manner
he sees fit.
This governmentally inflicted injury directly
undermines parents' fundamental right to rear their children in
ways that release, rather than staunch, the infinite possibilities
of the child's trajectory for breathtaking goodness and
Such unwelcome and uninvited governmental
achievement.
intervention can only serve to undermine the familial bond which

5 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); see also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
599-602 (1948) (recognizing difference in capacity of minor child compared to adult when
assessing voluntariness of a confession).
6 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 n.19 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing right of
family to remain together without interference by state (quoting Goldstein, Medical Care
for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645,
649-50 (1977) (footnotes omitted))).
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is vital to a child's sense of becoming and being an adult in his
own right. 7
Today, many African Americans still suffer from race-based
practices of law enforcement; 8 many are still affected by the
ultimate reality of abject impotence felt by their enslaved
ancestors. 9 "Despite birthright and generations' long residency in
the United States, African Americans are still deemed, at best,
'accidental' or 'default' citizens."lO This stigma, invariably and
inevitably, is imposed upon their children, either directly or
indirectly.11
Childhood is certainly too limited. For African American
children, it comes with an even briefer shelf life since childhood
and adulthood are conflated, often at a time when maturity has
not yet manifested, yet punishment and accountability are
applied if it has. 12 Still, the choice to love, nurture, and protect
children has always been a gesture of resistance for African
7 Id. at 825 n.19 (stating right to preservation of family integrity encompasses rights
of parent and child (citing Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State
Supervention of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649-50 (1977) (footnotes omitted))).
8 See Lenese C. Herbert, Bete Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National
Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 194 (2003) (discussing how race-based policing of
African Americans enforces that population's "subordinate status" and "substantively
attacks and ultimately destroys" their American birthright).
9 Id. at 195 (noting how race-based policing of African Americans "defines who is
American and who is not").
10 Id. at 177.
11 The United States has the second highest incarceration rate in the world, second
only to Russia. Although African Americans are approximately twelve percent of the
United States population, they comprise nearly fifty percent of those incarcerated. See
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE: THE SENTENCING PROJECT 125-26 (The New Press
1999). According to one scholar, an African American male born in 1991 has a twentynine percent chance of being incarcerated throughout his lifetime. Id. at 125-26.
Moreover, recent statistics compiled by various sources indicate that more Black men are
imprisoned than enrolled in universities or colleges. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Study Finds
Big Increase in Black Men as Inmates Since 1980, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at A14. The
certainty of this race-based fate, as well as its arbitrariness, has recently been described
by those most directly affected by it as "catching a case," i.e., being arrested for a criminal
violation. The phrase used by members of the "hip-hop" community evidences "the same
combination of responsibility and happenstance as when one 'catches' the common cold".
Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV.
983, 998 (2004).
12 African American children are overrepresented in juvenile arrests for both violent
crimes and property crimes. In 2002, the population of Caucasian juveniles was 78% and
the population of African American juveniles was 16%. However, the juvenile arrest rate
for African American youth was 43%. The Violent Crime Index arrest rate for African
American juveniles (per 100,000 in that racial group) was more than 3.5 times that of
Caucasian and American Indian Juveniles and 7 times that of Asian Juveniles. For
property crimes, the arrest rate for African American juveniles was almost double that of
Caucasian and American Indian juveniles. Howard Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 2002,
JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (Sept. 2004), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ojjdp.
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Americans.1 3 Depending on a number of factors within parental
control, "a child with a stigma can pass in a special way." While
larger societal racism may overdetermine many aspects of
African American adult lives and those of their children, African
Americans are still free to be self-determining.14 "Parents,
knowing of their child's stigmatic condition, may encapsulate
[her] with domestic acceptance and ignorance of what [she] is
going to have to become. When [she] ventures outdoors, [she]
does so therefore as an unwitting passer ... "15 That is, the child
passes as long as she is not aware of her stigma.16 During this
stage, her parents freely enjoy the benefit of their child's
unspoiled identity as long as they deem appropriate for the
health and integrity of the child, their parental authority, and
their family. Social identity management, i.e., exposure to the
child of her stigmatized and devalued social status, is left to her
parents. 1 7 Consequently, an event predictably traumatizes the
child; parents often take much care as to when, where, and how
such a revelation occurs, hoping to forestall the life-altering
event without compromising the child's healthy emotional, social,
and psychological development.' 8
Parental control of the introduction to these delicate and
challenging aspects of their child's identity information is
paramount.19 Particularly for parents of African American
children, "the Psychology of Nigrescence", the psychology of
becoming Black, 20 often requires skilled handling. The right to
13 BELL HOOKS, ROCK MY SOUL: BLACK PEOPLE AND SELF-ESTEEM 19 (Atria Books
2003) (examining various ways African people's psyches have been assaulted, bruised,
brutalized and damaged).
14 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY

90-91 (Simon & Schuster 1963). See generally HOOKS, supra note 13, at 15-20 (discussing
parenting and emotional well-being).
15 GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 90-91.
16 See id. at 91 (discussing the child's lack of knowledge about their stigma).
17 Id. at 19 ("It has been suggested that an individual's social identity divides up the
world of people and places for [her], and that [her] personal identity does this too,
although differently.").
18 See generally CLOVIS E. SEMMES, RACISM, HEALTH, AND POST-INDUSTRIALISM, A
THEORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN HEALTH 134 (Praeger Publishers 1996) (describing
importance of family as a "key protective institution").
19 See GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 86 (noting that "control of identity information has
special bearing on relationships").
20 "Psychology of Nigrescence" describes the "five stages of racial identity
development" in African American children: 1) pre-encounter, where the child absorbs
beliefs of the dominant white culture that celebrates and values whiteness over
Blackness; 2) encounter, where the child, thanks to a "heightened awareness of the
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family privacy and parental autonomy, as well as the reciprocal
liberty interest of the parent and child in their familial bond,
needs no greater justification than that they comport with each
state's fundamental constitutional commitment to individual
freedom and human dignity. Parents typically want to rear their
governmental interference. Given the
children with minimum
"negative hierarchies" 2 1 associated with African Americans in the
United States, African American parents and their families "have
been essential to counteract the stress-related effects of
22
structured inequality."
When African American children are the targets or witnesses
of race-based law enforcement, the child as an unspoiled bit of
human experience is sullied against the parental will and
constitutional rights not only to rear their children, but also to be
let alone. African American children so violated suffer lifelong
psychological and emotional scarring, as the images and
23
emotions at the time are indelibly imprinted on their psyche.
Parents pin their hopes and dreams - fulfilled and yet realized on the lives and liberty of their young children. Yet, the
fundamental right to parent successful Americans and healthy
citizens of the world becomes, at best, gravely compromised and,
at times, destroyed.
This article discusses the governmental subversion of the
African American's fundamental right to parent. 24 Specifically,
significance of race," begins to decide what it means to be a member of a subordinate
group; 3) immersionlemersion, a stage that requires the child to surround herself with
symbols, reminders, and visual evidence of her own racial group's culture, history, and
world contribution; 4) internalization, where the child begins to feel secure about her
racial identity and free to cross racial boundaries to establish relationships; and 5)
internalization-commitment, quite similar to the fourth stage, save for the individual has
"found ways to translate a personal sense of racial identity and is prepared to perceive
and transcend race." See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS
SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA? AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 54-55,
75-76, 83-84 (Basic Books 2003) (citing WILLIAM CROSS, SHADES OF BLACK: DIVERSITY IN
AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY (Temple University Press 1992)).
21 See Robert S.. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: CriticalRace
Theory, Post-Structuralism,and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1282 n.196 (1993)
(explaining that a negative hierarchy is created when oppressive patterns are repeated by
those who have known oppression).
22 SEMMES, supra note 18, at 134 (applauding overall success of African American
community and group culture in countering stress of American inequality).
23 See Sherilyn Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching,"
21 LAW & INEQ. 263, 291 (2003) (noting psychological effects of Black children who
witnessed lynchings).
24 This article does not discuss nor is its focus the doctrine of parens patriae, the
state's ability to provide protection for those unable to care for themselves.
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this article assesses how race-based policing under the guise of
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" obfuscates pernicious
disregard of African Americans' right to rear their children free
from hostile governmental interference, particularly when such
policing occurs in the presence of their children. Race-based
policing not only violates the African American parents' Fourth
Amendment right to be let alone, but also violates their
Fourteenth Amendment right to rear children when such policing
takes place in the presence of their children. Furthermore, the
imposition of these constitutional violations eviscerates a
parent's right to establish a positive foundation for their
children's ego knowledge, irrespective of their racial status in
society, resulting in a governmental "breeding" of race-based
stigma and rendering of impotence of the African American
parent. 2 5
I.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PARENT

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that
no State may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 2 6 Parental liberty interests in family
and familial relations have long been recognized as a component
of "substantive" due process, 2 7 which includes the rights to
"establish a home and bring up children." 28
A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of her child
has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as "perhaps the
25 The right to parent, considered fundamental and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides parents a liberty interest "in the companionship, care, custody,
and management of a parent's child." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). In
Stanley, the Supreme Court characterized the right to parent one's children as "cognizable
and substantial," holding that:
[t]he Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of
man,' and 'rights far more precious ...than property rights.' 'It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child resides first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.'
Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (asserting right to familial relations
is "the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized").
28 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651
(discussing that the integrity of the family has also found protection in the Ninth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized... "29 "The
'parental rights' doctrine is grounded on the premise that the
autonomy of parents should be protected and can be traced back
to the early 1900s."30 The Court has stated that the existence of a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter," 31 has
its source "not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they
32
have been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition."'
The Supreme Court has established that the liberties protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly include the right to
"bring up children."3 3 The right to rear a child as a parent deems
appropriate, as provided by the Due Process Clause, is among
"the most venerable of the liberty interests embedded in the
Constitution."3 4 The right is so deeply rooted in American history
and tradition, in so far as if that right is sacrificed, "neither
liberty nor justice would exist." 35 Unless the government has
evidence that challenges a parent's fitness to rear his child, the
Court has held that "no reason [exists] for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the

29 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
30 Pilitire, supra note 3 at 188 (2001) (discussing the legal rights of grandparents to
participate in the rearing of grandchildren).
31 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (explaining the privacy that
families have with regards to the state).
32 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)
(quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
33 Pillitire, supra note 3, at 188 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
34 See Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Croft v.
Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997)
(recognizing "constitutionally protected liberty interests that parents have in the custody,
care and management of their children"); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that the "state's removal of a child from his parents indisputably
constitutes an interference with a liberty interest of the parents and thus triggers the
procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901
F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff "does have a protectable liberty
interest in the care and custody of his children"); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 941 (6th
Cir. 1985) (explaining "that parents have a liberty interest in the custody of their
children"). See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(emphasizing that this liberty is protected by Due Process); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235
F.3d 1000, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating child's interest in being in care of parents);
Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining rights of
child to have family integrity); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977)
(noting that child has same family integrity right as parent).
35 Fields v. Palmdale School Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (C.D. Ca. 2003)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
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rearing of that parent's children." 36 "Until the state proves
parental unfitness, the child and [her] parents share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship ."37
"[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." 38 "[This] 'fundamental theory of
liberty' . . . relates to the Court's strong reliance on the concept of
individual
autonomy." 39
Although
some
courts
have
characterized this right to control and rear, its contours, and the
standard applicable to state law challenges as "not entirely
clear," 40 its legitimacy and doctrine are more widely accepted and
respected than the related right to familial integrity, which is
also rooted in Supreme Court doctrine as well the Fourteenth
Amendment.41 The right to familial integrity has been
denigrated and disfavored in the face of the right to control and
rear one's child,42 derided by some federal courts as a "broad" and
"abstract" right 43 whose "dimensions ...have yet to be clearly
established."44 Still, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
right's legitimacy and substantive due process basis in cases
36 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000); see also Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("[F]undamental theory of liberty upon which state
governments rely on excludes a general state power to standardize its children.").
37 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
38 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1978); see also Peggy
Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 299, 309 (1993) ("Drafters and advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment had vivid
impressions of what it meant to be denied rights of family, for the denial of those rights
was a hallmark of slavery....") (citation omitted).
39 Pillitire, supra note 3, at 189, n.70.
40 Deana Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 447, 454 (2002). According to Pollard, from its inception, the Court has only
provided limited protection for the parental right to rear. Id. Although the Court has
characterized the parental right to control children as "fundamental," the Court has never
applied strict scrutiny, or even intermediate scrutiny, to challenges of state laws based on
a parent's right to rear children. Id. 'Thus, despite referring to the parental right to
control children's upbringing as 'fundamental,' the Court's historical and contemporary
analysis of the right has shown little deference to parental actions that may harm
children." Id.
41 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (discussing protections
offered to family liberty by Due Process Clause).
42 See, e.g., Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 298 F.3d 81, 91 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting
that "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is among
the most venerable of the liberty interests embedded in the Constitution").
43 See, e.g., id. at 91 (characterizing right to familial integrity as "an abstract due
process liberty interest" in the context of qualified immunity setting).
44 See, e.g., id. at 93.
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spanning the precedents of Meyer v. Nebraska45 to Stanley v.
48
7
Illinois,46 and from Santosky v. Kramer4 to Troxel v. Granville.
Moreover, both rights are protected by both the substantive and
procedural components of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, which substantively, limits governmental
interference with these (and other) fundamental rights and
liberty interests and, procedurally, guarantees a "fair process"
regarding any such interference.
However, the Court has also made clear that "[a] parent's
rights with respect to her child have thus never been regarded as
absolute ... [and]

a

parent's interests

in

a child

must be

balanced against the State's long-recognized interests as parens
patriae."4 9 The state's ability to infringe on a parent's right to
rear children can be broken down into two categories: (1) cases
where the state's interest is based on its police power to protect
the public at large from societal ills; and (2) cases where the
state's interest is based on its parens patriae power to protect
children who cannot protect themselves. 5 0 Both interests fall
squarely within the state's police power to protect and advance
society, even against claims of fundamental rights' violations,
provided these interests are served by the state's actions.
For example, in Meyer, v. Nebraska, the seminal case
recognizing a parental right to rear children, the Court
essentially applied a rational basis test to the "fundamental"
right to control a child's upbringing. The Court stated that a
parent's liberty interest in child-rearing could be subverted to a
state's proper exercise of its police power via legislation that has
a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of

45 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (constraining state's ability to mandate public education over
and contrary to parental wishes).
46 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (constraining state's ability to remove child from parental
custody over and contrary to parental wishes).
47 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (constraining state's ability to sever parental rights in their
child over and contrary to parental wishes).
48 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (constraining state's ability to mandate grandparent visitation
rights over and contrary to parental wishes).
49 See id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (clarifying that the balancing approach
utilized in Prince and Yoder controlled).
50 See generally Pollard, supra note 40, at 454-55 (concluding that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the fundamental right to parent could support a ban on corporal
punishment by parents).
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the State to effect." 5 1 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court
reiterated that the parental right to rear is far from absolute, "[a]
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against
impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of
selection." 5 2 Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court stated
that a parent's power may be limited if it appears that parental
decisions will have a "potential for significant social burdens."53
The Yoder Court accepted the state's arguments that it had an
interest in preparing "citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system... [in order] to preserve
freedom and independence," 54 as well as in preparing individuals
to be "self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."55
More recently, the Court in Troxel v. Granville repeated that
the parent's right to rear is "fundamental," but did not articulate
a standard of review.5 6 The plurality opinion also failed to
answer the requisite state interest necessary to justify state
interference with the parent's discretion to control his children's
upbringing, but did imply that harm or potential harm to a child
would be an adequate basis for state intervention. The plurality
did employ a "combination of factors" test to determine that a
state's visitation law infringed upon the fundamental right to
parent, 57 noting constitutionally-derived protections in this area
"are best 'elaborated with care."' 58
Consequently, the standard of judicial scrutiny for cases
alleging a violation of the fundamental right to familial relations
51 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (noting that this police power is not
final, it is subject to the courts supervision).
52 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (noting that child employment
could be one of these dangers).
53 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (explaining that this limiting power is
necessary to protect either the health or safety of a child).
54 Id. at 221 (noting that Thomas Jefferson had initially come to this conclusion).
55 Id. (noting that the Court accepted both propositions).
56 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, at 68, 80 (2000) (noting the presumption that
fit parents will act in the best interests of their children).
57 See id. at 72-73 (stating that "the combination of these factors demonstrates that
the visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville's
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her two
daughters").
58 Id. at 73 (quoting the dissent of Justice Kennedy and explaining the reasoning
behind this).
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is unclear. 59 Some heightened level of scrutiny is maintained;
however, it also appears that strict judicial scrutiny 60 is not
certain nor required, 6 1 regardless of this right's fundamental
Therefore, a heightened scrutiny seems to be the
nature.
applicable standard, 62 but strict scrutiny does not appear
automatic.
Nonetheless, the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment still "denotes... the right of the
individual to... establish a home and bring up children... [and]
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
63
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE

The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures of persons, papers, and effects. 6 4 It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
place to be searched, and the
and particularly describing the
65
persons or things to be seized.
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is "to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials." 66 At the threshold of a
Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether governmental conduct

59 See, e.g., id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the Court failed to "set out
the exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with
his child").
60 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (clarifying that the Supreme
Court has held that when governmental infringement upon a fundamental right is
challenged, strict scrutiny is the standard against which the infringement is to be
measured).
61 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, at 65 (illustrating that the Court gives heightened
protection in these matters).
62 See id. at 65 (detailing that.. Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment
"provides heightened protection against governmental interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests").
63 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated").
65 Id.
66 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and County of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the
67
amendment.
Prior to seizing and searching an individual, police must be
able to justify their action by articulating that they had either
probable cause to believe that the individual was involved in
criminal activity, 68 which supports full governmental seizures via
custodial arrest, or reasonable suspicion 6 9 that such activity was
afoot. 70 Reasonable suspicion allows for "brief' and "less
intrusive" seizures and searches that are only "investigatory" in
nature and scope. 71 Investigatory seizures and searches are
commonly referred to as "Terry stops" and "Terry searches" or
"Terry frisks," respectively. During Terry stops and searches or
frisks, if an officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion that an
individual is armed and dangerous, the officer may seize the
individual and search that person's outer clothing. 7 2 Under the
Fourth Amendment, such searches are required to be no more
invasive than necessary to attain weaponry that may be used
against officers or bystanders. 7 3
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
governmental intrusions upon reasonable expectations of
privacy. 74 Reasonableness has been reported to turn on
Under the Fourth
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
67 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (describing the question of
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred as "antecedent").
68 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness based on probable cause for all arrests); see also United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (affirming constitutionality of warrantless
felony arrest based on probable cause).
69 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 416-18 (1981) (stating that reasonable
suspicion is determined via the totality of the circumstances, relying on "certain
commonsense conclusions about human behavior").
70 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). Prior to the Court's decision in Terry,
police were required to have "probable cause" to believe that a suspect had committed or
was committing a crime prior to seizing and searching him. See also Brinegar,338 U.S. at
176; Watson, 423 U.S. at 423-24. With Terry, the Court lowered the level of constitutional
suspicion so that officers need only articulate a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot to support a stop. Additionally, if the officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion
that the same individual is armed and dangerous, the officer may also conduct a limited
search for the purpose of disarming the seized individual. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-30.
71 To the extent that, during an investigatory stop, probable cause develops, the
police may affect full, custodial arrest. See Terry, '392 U.S. at 10.
72 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (allowing police bfficers to conduct limited searches of
outer clothing to discover weapons on the basis of reasonable suspicion).
73 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (stating that the search for weapons must be reasonable).
74 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (stating that where an individual "may harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion").
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Amendment (applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment), unreasonable governmental searches and seizures
are prohibited and the governmental agent must have probable
75
cause to conduct a search, as evidenced by a search warrant.
If a person is searched or seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the presiding judicial authority must
evaluate the governmental action "under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." 76 Reasonableness, the Court has also
said, is context-dependent. 77
When an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy i.e., when the individual has manifested an actual/subjective
expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable 78
- warrantless activity by law enforcement will be considered
presumptively unreasonable. 79 The action will then be considered
constitutional only if it falls within one of the "specifically
established and well delineated exceptions" to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements.8 0 These
exceptions are supposed to be parsimoniously gifted because the
Fourth Amendment privacy interests must be zealously guarded.
Seminal and inextricably entwined with the right against
unreasonable governmental searches and seizures is the right to
be let alone.S1 Justice Brandeis has characterized the right to be
let alone as paramount in a free American society:

75 See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (quoting the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
76 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
77 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (stating that "what is
reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place"); see also Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that context of location has
impact on legitimacy of privacy expectations).
78 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(discussing when a person has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy).
79 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (claiming that a
search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable).
80 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (citations omitted) (stating that
unauthorized searches and seizures are subject to few specifically established exceptions).
81 See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145, 145
(1994) (quoting JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION 152 (Univ. Of Chicago
Press 1990)).
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[O]nly a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are
to be found in material things. [The drafters] sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. [The drafters] conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
must be deemed a
individual, whatever the means employed,
82
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The right to be let alone could easily be regarded as a natural,
coextensive and complementary challenge to governmental
activity when children are involved, usually in the context of
schools. School-aged children do not give up their reasonable
expectation of privacy, nor do they relinquish their constitutional
rights at the perimeter of the school.8 3 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has not required a search warrant before school officials
may search students, and in fact, has lowered the standard of
suspicion for school authorities from probable cause that a crime
has or is occurring to reasonable suspicion that criminality is
afoot.8 4 This lessening of the governmental burden8 5 rested upon
the Court's perception that a school's interests in discipline and
86
order outweigh the students' privacy interests.

82 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
83 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (stating the Fourth
Amendment provides that the Federal Government shall not violate "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures"); see generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (establishing that students or teachers do not shed their First
Amendment constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate).
84 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (stating that the warrant
requirement is unsuited to the school environment).
85 In T.L.O., the test crafted for proper Fourth Amendment searches was whether the
school's authority was justified at its inception and the search was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified interference. See id. at 341. The Court there did
not address searches conducted "by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of
law enforcement agencies." Id.
86 See id. (stating that requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a
child "would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in the schools"); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)
(plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989)) (holding that "where a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the
guide for analyzing these claims.").
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rendered that improper
officer motives to seize and search are irrelevant.8 7 In fact, even
though many commentators and lower courts have highlighted
that improper officer motivations proliferate when people of color
are policed, 88 the Court has maintained that "subjective [officer]
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth
Amendment analysis." 89 As the Court's Fourth Amendment
interpretation now stands, "reasonable suspicion" translates into
officer discretion; officer discretion precedes prejudiced policing,
as officer perception of race pervades discretion. When subjective
and even improper officer motive is disregarded, a confounding
dilemma for citizens of color arises. 90
To the extent that the investigation and thwarting of
criminality is the government's interest, understand that the
level of "criminality" that is at hand when police stop - but do not
arrest adults - is extremely low. Obviously, police are not going
to allow those whom they have probable cause to believe have
committed a violent or otherwise serious crime to walk away.
Nor will police who have witnessed actions of potential
criminality, which later ripen into actual law-breaking, turn
their heads. No, the police will arrest and prosecute these
individuals.
Often, those who are not criminally prosecuted following their
arrest are seldom the suspects of a violent felony. Rather, these
are typically persons who have violated traffic codes or some sort
of vehicular equipment requirement, or who are merely "present"
in places where police believe crime is occurring. Given this
standard, misdemeanors of all stripes can lead to "lawful"

87 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (announcing that it was
unwilling "to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on actual motivations of
individual officers."). See generally Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 769-72 (2001) (per
curiam) (citing Whren in determining that officer's subjective knowledge of driver's
criminal activity prior to committing traffic violation, subsequent arrest, and inventory
search are irrelevant and that probable cause independently supported arrest).
88 See, e.g., Randall S. Susskind, Race, ReasonableArticulable Suspicion, and Seizure,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 332-34 (1994) (discussing the role a suspect's race in
encounters with law enforcement).
89 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
90 See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 5, 6 (discussing the discrimination faced
by people with a 'stigma', from those that are 'normal').
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arrests, 9 1 even the most ludicrous and "comparably foolish." 92
Serious nor dangerous criminals are not being ferreted out when
these individuals are stopped, investigated, and arrested. All
that is accomplished is the psychological damage of the
individual and, if arrested in the presence of one or more
children, a violation of the parental right to rear children free
American
from such psychological and emotional damage.
society is implicated, and its tacit complicity and approval - via
silence in the face of mounting, recorded, and admitted violations
93
- are evidence to indict.

This effect is especially apparent when the parent is not
threatening the child's health, safety, or well-being. 9 4 That the
Fourth Amendment does not contemplate individual officer
motivation is illogical. By announcing such a standard, the
Court condemns African Americans, as well as other minorities,
to a permanent status of inferiority, while simultaneously
masking the relegation in the lofty language of equality,
colorblindness, and objectivity. Within this ironically biased,
punitive structure of judicial review, the studied ignorance
"insures wrong results by assuming a pseudo-objective posture
that does not permit it to hear the complex dialogue concerning
91 See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 332-36, 354 (2001) (stating that the
defendant's violation of a transportation code in the presence of a peace officer was
grounds for a lawful arrest).
92 Id. at 353 n.23. Atwater was followed in one case in which a preteen girl was
arrested after a transit police officer witnessed her eating - a violation of the public
transit's "zero tolerance" regulations - one french fry while standing on a subway train's
platform. See Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145, 160 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). The district court judge stated that although he was bound by the Atwater
decision, he "note[d] with sadness that [the Atwater] dissent's prediction has proved
correct. The Court [put] its imprimatur on the 'foolish' warrantless arrest authority of
defendants for the serious offense of eating a french fry on a subway platform." Id. at 160.
93 See generally People v. Sutton, 19 Cal. App. 4th 795, 802 (1993) (discussing the
inferring of guilt from a criminal defendant's silence, and whether it is proper).
94 Some may argue that African American parents who shield their children from
such race-based encounters with law enforcement are, in the United States, damaging
their children, who will be more than traumatized upon the first adult encounter with
such policing. In fact, these individuals would argue that such parenting would require
the state to intervene, given that the parents are setting their child(ren) up for a large
and painful fall that, had exposure to such policing early on occurred, would be more of an
irritant (versus a major event). I liken this parenting mind set to that exercised against
enslaved Africans who were "trained" and treated to get accustomed to what would face
them as chattel slaves in the United States. Such "seasoning" is, at best, a cruel "breaking
in" an individual violently and for a purpose that serves the oppressor, not the individual.
As the right to parent serves the parent and not the police, certainly the notion of
seasoning these children is not only unappealing, it is not the real option for healthy
parents of these children. Many, especially if they are African American parents, will be
quite aware that race-based activities will occur against their children.
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the identity question, particularly as it pertains to historically
dominated groups." 95 Yet, the Court maintains in the face of
legitimate, contrary evidence that race does not matter or
register in Fourth Amendment policing. 9 6

Therefore, in the context of familial relations and the
fundamental right to parent, if the Fourth Amendment fully
protects against unlawful arrests, courts should not consider the
more broad, amorphous, and general protections established by
Fourteenth Amendment due process. 97 As the court in Graham v.
Connor stated, "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive government conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due
98
process' must be the guide for analyzing the claims."

However, in the context of African-American parenting in a
racially-based policing state, does the Fourth Amendment
provide adequate protection?
Harassing African American
parents in the presence of their children demonstrates a
disavowal of the purported American melting pot and equality.
Essentially, it is a defrocking and divesting of legitimacy and
authority.
Similarly, harassing African American children, without the
assent or knowledge of their parents, 99 divests those parents of
95 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1762 (1993)
(arguing that the premise that the law is fair as it applies to different racial groups is
incorrect).
96 Mhe law holds to the basic premise that definition from above can be fair to
those below, that beneficiaries of racially conferred privilege have the right to
establish norms for those who have historically been oppressed pursuant to those
norms, and that race is not historically contingent. Although the substance of race
definitions has changed, what persists is the expectation of white-controlled
institutions in the continued right to determine meaning-the reified privilege of
power-that reconstitutes the property interest in whiteness in contemporary form.
Id. at 1762.
97 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (noting that in claims of excessive
force by law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment should be used as analysis, not the
more generalized due process clause).
98 Id.
99 Here, I speak of programs such as "Scared Straight," which purport to help parents
of children deemed out-of-control and criminally inclined or precocious by placing these
children in prisons and jails to allow them to get a taste of the reality of incarceration
with hardened criminals.
The name comes from a program initiated by the Lifer's Juvenile Detention Program,
nicknamed "Scared Straight," where children deemed to be juvenile delinquents were
taken to a New Jersey maximum security prison to interact with hardened 'lifers,"
inmates sentenced to one or multiple life terms. These inmates gave the children blunt
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their parental and even societal authority in the traumatized
child's view. When parents are unable to protect their children
from the so-called "bad guys," children learn early on that
sometimes, evil not only may triumph, but trump parental
omnipotence and authority.

III. "PWB": PARENTING WHILE BONDSMEN10O
The United States Supreme Court has long determined that a
parental right to have1 0 1 and raise one's children as the parent
102
sees fit is fundamental and protected under the Constitution.
Traditionally, the Court has determined that a third party or
state acting as parens patriae03 may only interfere with a
accounts of daily prison life; the documentary was met with wide acclaim, garnering one
Emmy award.
As a result, the documentary spawned similar techniques or programs of intimidation
by various groups to dissuade children from numerous social ills such as smoking, drunk
driving, drag racing, and crime. In 2000, the Surgeon General's report on youth violence,
described such programs as ineffective:
[Sihock probation or parole program in which brief encounters with inmates
describing the brutality of prison life or short-term incarceration in prisons or jails is
expected to shock, or deter, youths from committing crimes. Numerous studies of
Scared Straight have demonstrated that the program does not deter future criminal
activities. In some studies, rearrest rates were similar between controls and youths
who participated in Scared Straight. In others, youths exposed to Scared Straight
actually had higher rates of rearrest than youths not involved in this intervention.
Studies of other shock probation programs have shown similar effects.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon
General, at http://www.surgeongeneral.govflibrary/youthviolence/chapter5/sec6.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004).
100 See Herbert, supra note 8, at 171-73 (noting that race-based policing can lead to
criminalizing a number of lawful activities because of law enforcement's criminalizing the
African American, including but not limited to, "IWB, idling while Black, WWB, walking
while Black, SWB, shopping or standing while Black, and even BWB, breathing while
Black") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
101 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Court has accorded a high degree of
constitutional respect to a natural parent's interest in controlling the details of a child's
upbringing).
102 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that raising
children is a fundamental liberty interest); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36
(1925) (determining a law that requires parents to send their children to public school
interferes with the parents' liberty interest); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (noting that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents. .. ');Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (reiterating the recognition
that "[the] freedom.., of family life is a protected fundamental liberty interest"); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding a law that denied unwed fathers custody of
their children after the mother dies to be unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 235-36 (1972) (holding that the Amish should be exempted from a law requiring
children to attend school past the eighth grade).
103 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 485 (6th ed. 1990) (defining parens patriae as "the
state regarded as a sovereign").
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family, if there is a showing of harm and that the child's best
interests are at stake.
However, for centuries, parents of African American children
were legislated congenitally impotent to rear their children in the
manner they saw fit. "Under America's system of slavery,
African Americans were defined as chattel or property, with no
rights that Whites had to respect."104 The Founding Fathers'
characterization of the African and his/her American-born
descendants was deliberate, 10 5 leading to the national, state, and
local codification of their inferiority, while existing within the
borders of the United States.10 6 Courts followed suit, creating a
race-based slave class, a class where members were "legally
deemed less than human, for nothing more than the color of their
skin ... and giving white society license to subjugate these
others at will."1 07
"The denial of full citizenship and dignified treatment to
[B]lacks was rationalized, explained, and justified under the law,
both explicitly and implicitly, by a socially and culturally
constructed theory of race ... [which] posited race as an objective
fact, and the white race as inherently and biologically superior to
all others."10 8 The multigenerational violation of the enslaved
humans' sense of family "was fundamental to the character of
American slavery; it began in the claim of ownership that
superseded parental bonds." 10 9 Slavery also required that those
enslaved "be bound more surely by ties of ownership than by ties
of kinship." 110 As such and pursuant to the centuries' long
ownership of Africans in America, "[w]hites were cast in the role
of custodians for this primitive race.., to hold them in servitude
104 Abel A. Bartley, The FourteenthAmendment: The Great Equalizerof the American
People, 36 AKRON L. REV. 473, 482 (2003).
105 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1311-13 (2000) ("Some Founders acknowledged that
they felt the Union was more important than the end of chattel slavery.").
106 Id. at 1310-11 (noting at least twenty constitutional provisions that preserved
and expanded chattel slavery).
107 Norman Redlich, "Out, Damned Spot; Out, I Say:" The Persistence of Race in
American Law, 25 VT. L. REV. 475, at 478 (2001) (discussing how prior to America's
unique version of slavery, such a statis' was obtained as a result of a population being
"vanquished in a war" or contractually "indebted" for a limited period or amount).
108 Rhonda Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race
Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 495
(2003).
109 See Davis, supra note 38, at 335.
110 See Davis, supra note 38, at 309.
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to prevent the type of wanton savagery that would result from
their living freely . . ."111 "In the process, 112 race-based categories
came to be filled with meaning - Blacks were characterized one
way, whites another."11 3 Caucasians - American born or not were the recipients of constitutional freedoms; Blacks were unfit
for civil society"14 and its freedoms."i 5 This was an American
tenet; freedom and liberty were rights for Americans, not their

property. 116
111 See Redlich, supra note 107 at 479.
112 Even before "the process," the laws - specifically, the Constitution - loaded racebased categories against the enslaved. Five Constitutional provisions clearly sanctioned
American chattel slavery. The first, also known as the "three fifths clause," which for the
purpose of Southern representation in Congress, counted three-fifths of all slaves (Art. I, §
2. cl. 3); the second prohibited Congress from ending the African slave trade before 1808,
but did not require Congress to prohibit slave trading afterwards (Art. I, § 9, cl. 1); the
third required calculation of federal taxes pursuant to the "three-fifths clause," (Art I., § 9,
cl. 4); the fourth, also known as the "fugitive slave clause," which prohibited states from
emancipating runaways and required that they be returned to their owners "on demand"
(Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3); and the fifth prohibited pre-1808 amendment of the slave importation
or capitation clauses (Art. V).
See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the
Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 428-29 (2002). Additionally, Professor
Finkelman argues:
Numerous other clauses of the Constitution supplemented the five clauses that
directly protected slavery. Some provisions that indirectly guarded slavery, such as
the prohibition on taxing exports, were included primarily to protect the interests of
slaveholders. Others, such as the guarantee of federal support to 'suppress
Insurrections' and the creation of the electoral college, were written with slavery in
mind, although delegates also supported them for reasons having nothing to do with
slavery.
Id. at 429. Professor Finkleman further implicates a sizeable number of additional
provisions that indirectly supported American chattel slavery. Id. at 429-32. Finkleman
notes that General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a purportedly staunch and able
defender of slavery, summed for his constituents how slavery fared at the Constitutional
Convention: "considering all circumstances, we have made the best terms for the security
of this species of property it was in our power to make. We would have made better if we
could; but on the whole, I do not think them bad." Id. at 433.
113 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1373-74 (1988)
(discussing the historical oppositional dualities attributed to the two races); see also
Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the
Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,2
(2002) (stating that "[f]aw helps define the boundaries of racial groups").
114 See Taslitz, supra note 105, at 1313 (describing how early Americans justified
chattel slavery of Africans - deemed "incapable of enjoying political liberty.., unworthy
of it," and "unable to profit from even limited individual liberty").
115 See Redlich, supra note 107, at 479 (noting that American colonies deemed blacks
as inherently barbaric and therefore unable to enjoy the freedoms of a civilized society).
116 PHILLIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD 65 (Alfred A. Knopf 1990).
[S]urely there is in all children, though not alike, a stubbornness, and stoutness of
mind arising from natural pride, which must, in the first place, be broken and
beaten down; that so the foundation of their education being laid in humility and
tractableness, other virtues may, in their time, be built thereon ...
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This system included the right to parent children. Children
were an integral part of the plantation system that cradled the
United States during centuries of growth and development." 7
Accordingly, separation of families was a routine and inherent
practice during American slavery; whole families were rarely sold
as intact units, as the most common practice was selling one
man, woman, or child at a time.11S Those enslaved parents who
were spared early deprivation of their children knew that their
days of parenting and their child's relative innocence and joy
were numbered." 9
During American slavery, infancy was perhaps the most idyllic
time for enslaved parents and their offspring.' 2 0 No wonder:
similar to the forced "grace period" planters endured while
maintaining crop seedlings and livestock offspring, owners of
human property were similarly forced to wait until their new or
young enslaved "crops" grew sufficiently sturdy and tall, before
hacking them at their root, chopping them down for monetary
gain.12'Inevitably, "there came that blight, which too surely
117 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER, RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON
THE PLANTATION 50-51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) ("Sales, trades, transfers, auctions,
migration of slave-holders meant that mothers were taken from children, wives from
husbands, children from parents, fathers from sons and daughters, and blood kin from
one another.").
118 "The fear of being sold away from family and friends caused constant
apprehension and worry. When the fateful moment arrived, as it often did, slaves pleaded
with masters not to separate them from loved ones." See id. at 52. One notable author
has also described the separation of slaves from their families as:
Could you have seen that mother clinging to her child, when they fastened the irons
upon his wrists;. could you have heard her heart-rending groans, and seen her
bloodshot eyes wander wildly from face to face, vainly pleading for mercy; could you
have witnessed that scene ... you would exclaim, Slavery is damnable!
See also Harriet Ann Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, in SLAVE NARRATIVES
769 (William L. Andrews & Henry Louis Gates, Jr. eds., The Library of America 2000).
119 See, e.g., id. at 753 (noting the author's sudden and rude realization of her slave
status at six years old: "[t]hose were happy days - too happy to last").
120 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 118, at 751 (relating the author's life, being born into
slavery, but "never [knowing] it till [sic] six years of happy childhood had passed away;"
further stating that "I was so fondly shielded that I never dreamed that I was a piece of
merchandise, trusted to [my parents] for safe keeping, and liable to be demanded of them
at any moment.").
121 See, e.g. id. at 753 (noting the sudden and rude realization of her slave status at
the age of six years old). See generally Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of
FrederickDouglass, in SLAVE NARRATIVES 281 (William L. Andrews & Henry Louis Gates,
Jr. eds., The.Library of America 2000) (noting that the author was separated from his
mother at birth, "a common custom, in the part of Maryland from which I ran away, to
part children from their mothers at a very early age"); id. at 282 ("Frequently, before the
child has reached its twelfth month, its mother is taken from it, and hired out on some
farm a considerable distance off, and the child is placed under the care of an old woman,
too old for field labor."); id. ("For what this separation is done, I do not know, unless it be
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waits on every human being born to be a chattel."12 2 Children
were often taken from their parents and sold away to the highest
bidder; children, particularly between the ages of seven and
twelve years old, would bring the highest prices.12 3 Babies,
infants, toddlers, and young children were whipped, beaten,
tortured, and raped repeatedly, often bearing the offspring of
their rapists/owners;1 24 children were also part of the "eyes wide
shut" sexual exploitation of those enslaved.
Commensurate with the destruction of families, African
American parents were deprived of authority over their children
in the most humbling and humiliating means. Children watched
a myriad of "lessons" taught on the backs and greased by the
blood of their parents. American slavery and intergenerational
trading completely destroyed parent/child bonds or stable
families.12 5
Thus, children of chattel quickly learned that parental
obedience and obeisance came second, at best, to obeying their
actual, potential, and ostensible owners. Obviously, enslaved
parents could not well protect their children.12 6 Children were
to hinder the development of the child's affection toward its mother and to blunt and
destroy the natural affection of the mother for the child. This is the inevitable result.").
But see, e.g., id. at 759 (relating how a nursing mother was, periodically, "locked up, away
from her nursing baby, for a whole day and night"); id. at 753 (noting how the author's
mother "had been weaned at three months old, that the babe of the [white] mistress might
obtain sufficient food").
122 Id. at 753.
123 See FRANKLIN & SCHWENINGER, supra note 117, at 50-51 (asserting that "[t]he
trauma of being separated forever from kith and kin can hardly be imagined").
124 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 118, at 771-75 (describing the author's loss of sexual
innocence at fifteen years of age, when her owner pressed upon her his requirement that
she be forced into sexual slavery in addition to her overt slave duties).
125 See id. at 74 (explaining that slave owners' control constantly assaulted family
stability).
126 Consider this recollection of a typical New Year's Day, from the perspective of an
enslaved woman:
Hiring-day at the south takes place on the 1t of January. On the 2d, the slaves are
expected to go to their new masters... Then comes New Year's eve; and they gather
together their little alls, or more properly speaking, their little nothings, and wait
anxiously for the dawning of day. At the appointed hour the grounds are thronged
with men, women, and children, waiting, like criminals, to hear their doom
pronounced...
[T]o the slave mother New Year's day comes laden with peculiar sorrows. She sits on
her cold cabin floor, watching the children who may all be torn from her the next
morning; and often does she wish that she and they might die before the day dawns.
She may be an ignorant creature, degraded by the system that has brutalized her
from childhood; but she has a mother's instincts, and is capable of feeling a mother's
agonies.
Jacobs, supra note 118, at 760-61.
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routinely sold 12 7 away from their mothers, fathers, and siblings.
These children could be subjugated by virtually any white person
and parents were required to look away. Such a realization,
particularly when the birth parents and child(ren) remained on
the same property, created a clear divide between parents and
their children. 128
IV."PWB": PARENTING WHILE BLACK
As property, enslaved people occupied the same status as other
property, separate and apart from the human family.129 The
latter-day attempts to apply status and privileges to de jure and
genetic non-citizens were artificial and forced. The United States
130
had been a nation ruled exclusively by privileged white males.
The omnipotence of Whites and race-based supremacy so
completely pervaded American society that attempts to create
humans from enslaved Blacks was otherworldly. "[H]ow do you
3
take property and turn it into humans?"1 1
The Fourteenth Amendment "was America's first attempt to
legally challenge White supremacist ideas by creating a truly
equal multiracial society... legally changing African American
men into White men so that they could enjoy all the rights,
privileges, and immunities of United States citizenship."'132 The
127 See, e.g., id. at 752 (reciting that the author's grandmother, despite saving to buy
her children from those who owned them, was forced to suffer her five children being
"divided among her master's children.., sold, in order that each heir might have an
equal portion of dollars and cents").
128 See, e.g., id. at 755. The author recalls an incident where her brother had to
choose between responding to the beck and call of his father or "his mistress." Id. She
stated, "[olne day, when his father and his mistress both happened to call him at the same
time, [my brother] hesitated between the two; being perplexed to know which had the
strongest claim upon his obedience." Id. The author's brother ultimately went to "his
mistress" and, after being scolded by his father later for doing so, the father noted, "[y]ou
are my child.., and when I call you, you should come immediately, if you have to pass
through fire and water." Id.
129 See Bartley, supra note 104, at 482 (announcing that slavery provided African
Americans with "no rights that Whites had to respect").
130 See Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a
Color Blind Society, 36 Akron L. Rev. 693, 696 (2003).
131 Id. at 484 (discussing African American status post-Civil War).
132 Id. at 473. As "the rights and privileges of American citizenship had been reserved
exclusively for White men," no provisions for full citizenship were made for any other
extant population within the United States. Id. at 479. Moreover, during the drafting of
the Constitution, "[tihe fifty-five White men who met in Philadelphia, in May 1787...
never considered African American citizenship. The only times African Americans were
mentioned were in reference to their propertied status." Id. at 480.
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Fourteenth Amendment changed the de jure law. However, the
legal and societal legacy of Black inferiority crippled the
amendment's spirit from the outset. 133 Because the United
States failed to define objectives for equal opportunity, the
creation of laws simply opened access, but did not create means
to actualize goals or assess progress. 134 The constitutional
addendum could not change White Americans' de facto racebased attitudes; 135 they refused to accept African American
equality. 136 Consequently a stigma was borne from a societal
belief that blacks were not equal to whites. 137 Thus, one basic
flaw in crafting African American citizenship and associated
rights may have been faulty reliance upon fictional American
foundations of race neutrality, equality, and color-blindness.
138
Such an American society has never existed.
Thus legislation - even of Constitutional magnitude - proved
139
ineffective in abolishing all race-based notions of citizenship.
133 See Wallace, supra note 130, at 697-98 (characterizing the Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution as disingenuous and, perhaps, duplicitous, given
the espousing of freedom and equality while ignoring the reality of chattel slavery of
Africans).
134 Id. at 695.
135 The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution are the
foundational documents of our democratic form of government. They espouse the
values and virtues of equality and freedom for all men. However, the framers did
not include Africans in their quest for freedom and independence... .In fact, at the
time the ideas and ideals were penned in the Declaration of Independence, the
Founders argued for their freedom from the tyranny of Great Britain; while at the
same time denying the same freedoms, enslaving some Africans, and denying human
and civil rights to free Africans in America. Furthermore, in the last paragraph of
the Declaration of Independence, the Founders blamed the 'Christian king' for
slavery, but gave no ownership for their own duplicity in enslaving Africans in
America.
Id. at 698.
136 Id. at 473 (noting that the reality of changing law did not change race-based
attitudes); id. (quoting the 1866 Cincinnati Enquirer's statement that "[s]lavery is
dead, . . . the negro [sic] is not, there is the misfortune.").
137 "It was not just enslavement or the notion that slaves were inferior in the minds
of whites in the eighteenth century, but rather that all Africans in America were inferior
to Whites." See Wallace, supranote 130, at 700. "The African race in the United States
even when free, are everywhere a degraded class.... They are not looked upon as a
citizen by the contracting parties who formed the Constitution. They were evidently not
supposed to be included by the term citizens." Paul Finkleman, DRED SCOTT V.
SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 56 (Bedford Books 1997) (quoting
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney).
138 See Wallace, supra note 130, at 705.
139 Id. at 703 (opining that "[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them in the same plane").
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Law and law enforcement were the keys to control these newly
created Americans.14 0 Determining the meaning of equality
quickly uncovered the racism which characterized United States
citizenship.141
V. THE DENOUEMENT: STRANGE FRUIT 142 OF THE POISONOUS

TREE

14 3

"It takes only a handful of minutes... to change the course of a
lifetime. It takes only an instant to become a cripple."144
When children suffer societal injustice, they are hurt thrice:
"indirectly through its direct effects on their caretakers and adult
support systems;"14 5 systemically, when "the structures of
discrimination and disadvantage reach beyond adulthood and
into childhood in the form of unequal access to the educational
system, segregated housing, disproportional arrests and
confinements (of children of color), and sexism;"14 6 and directly,
through cruel and unjust treatment, merely because they are
47
children.1
140 See Herbert, supra note 8, at 169 (explaining that African Americans suffered at
the hands of mobs which often included law enforcement officers).
141 See Bartley, supra note 104, at 473 (declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment
could not eliminate racism among White Americans).
142 This portion of the article's section heading is taken from a song of the same
name, written by Allen (Meerpol) and first performed by Billie Holliday. The lyrics are as
follows:
Southern trees bear strange fruit, blood on the leaves and blood at the roots, Black
bodies swinging in the southern breeze, strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.
Pastoral scene of the gallant south, the bulging eyes and the twisted mouth, Scent of
magnolias, sweet and fresh, Then the sudden smell of burning flesh.
Here is fruit for the crows to pluck, for the rain to gather, for the wind to suck, for the
sun to rot, for the trees to drop, here is a strange and bitter crop.
BILLIE HOLLIDAY, Strange Fruit, on THE COMPLETE COMMODORE RECORDINGS (Verve
Records 1939).
143 The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine requires courts to reject evidence
illegally obtained by the police, i.e., obtained subsequent to a constitutional violation. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1973). The "poison" of official wrongdoing
renders the resultant "fruit" virtually useless, unless intervening events sufficiently break
the causal connection. Id. at 487-88. See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939) (coining term for the first time); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (recognizing remedy for criminal defendants).
144 GARBARINO ET AL, NO PLACE TO BE A CHILD: GROWING UP IN A WAR ZONE 6
(Lexington Books 1991).
145 Grahn-Farley, supra note 1, at 298.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 299 (asserting that "social practice of exploiting the weakest in the society
affects the child").
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According to parents, coping with danger and observing its
effects on a child's behavior is extremely stressful.148 Moreover,
"the prejudices parents have endured during their own
childhoods can add to the pain of seeing their own child hurt."149
"Parents are likely to be driven by their own need to protect
the[ir] child."150 When children are unable to view their parents
as powerful, there is a detrimental shift in the parent/child
relationship and in the necessary dynamic for that relationship
to survive. Given the shift in perception, parents must deal with
a child that has borne the scars of a world that devalues and
dehumanizes. When the government subverts or ignores the
parent's right to rear children free from race-based interference,
it hints that the parent is incapable of protecting its offspring.
For the parent and the child, the experience of race-based
policing has long and detrimental effects.151
A. Impotent Me (Parent)
"Forunto us a child is born.

...

"152

Chattel slavery haunts the American collective unconscious,
particularly given the nation's limited acknowledgement of its
lingering modern effects, aside from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. Our discussions of it are cloaked in
mystery and historical characterizations. In fact, slavery and its
lingering effects on the nation require complex, multi-faceted
exploration, much the same way any malignancy does.
One major component of slavery's brutality and its post-Civil
War legacy is the terrorism of lynching. "The memory of
lynchings was indelibly engraved onto the collective psyche of
black communities for generations."1 53 One scholar has described

148 See GARBARINO ET AL, supra note 144, at 143 (discussing parent's reaction to
children in danger).
149 BRAZELTON & SPARROW, supra note 4, at 348.
150 BRAZELTON & SPARROW, supra note 4, at 349.
151 Cf. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 291 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "juveniles subjected to preventive detention come to see society at large as hostile
and oppressive and to regard themselves as irremediably 'delinquent"').
152 Isaiah 9:6 (King James).
153 See Ifill, supra note 23, at 287 (discussing the significant lingering effects of
lynchings in the African-American community).
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effects of lynching upon the actual and

collective unconscious of the African American community:
Black families were profoundly psychologically affected by
lynchings. The continuous threat of physical violence
undoubtedly affected interactions between community
members. Family members were prevented from seeking
justice for the lynching of a loved one because of the threat
that they too would be lynched. Family members were often
too frightened to attend the funeral of their lynched loved
one. They were often required to retrieve the mutilated
bodies or ashes of their victimized loved ones from the
lynching site.
Black residents who observed the mutilated bodies of
lynching victims must have been deeply traumatized by the
image. Whites deliberately displayed lynching victims, or
dragged their bodies through the black community.... [i]n
many cases, blacks heard the lynchings as they happened.
White crowds numbering in the hundreds, often shouted
their approval or cheered during the lynching. Shooting
hundreds of rounds of bullets at the victim's hanging body
was a routine practice. No doubt that in many instances,
although shuttered in their homes during a lynching, blacks
could hear the horrible cries of lynching victims who were
tortured. 154
B. Impotent Thee (Child)

"According to physicians specializing in the treatment of
children and adolescents, 'children who witness violence early in
life, come to see the world as dangerous and unpredictable, and
their own place in it as tenuous."'155 "The problems these
children suffer can affect their ability to function normally in
their home and at school." 156 Sleep disturbances, flashbacks, and
emotional detachment problems are all routinely reported
symptoms of children who have been exposed to acts of
violence.1 57 "[T]he situation of the child is both unique to being a

154 Id. at 298-301.
155 Id. at 291 (discussing the psychological problems of black children who witness
lynchings).
156 Id.
157 Id.
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child and, at the same time, inseparable from the situation of the
8
adult."15
Children are spoken of as casualties of all wars and there is
clearly an understanding as to why. The malingering "wars"
against drugs and crime has taken a public relations backseat to
the War On Terror. Being forced off center stage, however, does
not mean that those campaigns have slowed or suffered
acknowledged defeat. To the contrary, these are ongoing efforts
that no longer require justification, statistics, or palpable injury.
They have morphed into catch-all efforts, which allow those
frustrated leaders to parade the latest prisoners of war, who are
often African Americans, in front of the curious and confused
Each time the government exercises its ability to
public.
dominate such prisoners, the government reanimates and
59
resurrects slavery's "visceral destructions.1
Race-based policing is not only "domestic terrorism,"160 it
effectively may be a precursor to a nation's implosion. What
lesson is learned when the "good guys" treat parents as the evil
ones, the bad ones, the criminals? In one fell swoop, the parents,
the children, and those who are like them in the eyes of society
are "un-kinned,"16 1 i.e., disengaged from the American family
and the power of the American myth.
This is troubling. Race-based policing - particularly in the
presence of African American children - serves the same purpose
and creates the same result as the "law enforcement" system of
lynching: a damaged, fear-driven lesser vessel of human
158 Grahn-Farley, supra note 1, at 299 (noting the particularly vulnerable position of
children in society).
159 See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, MERCY, MERCY ME: THE ART, LOVES & DEMONS OF
is unavoidable that we view
MARVIN GAYE 216 (Civitas Books, 2004) (opining that "[i]t
corporal punishment's long trajectory in the light of its violent use to control black bodies
and to coerce their compliance to white rule.").
160 Id. at 217 (coining the phrase "domestic terrorism" in association with
internalized race-based self-hatred's incorporation of chattel slavery's brutal
methodologies).
161 Id. "Un-kinning" is defined as an act that "violently unmak[es]" and "dismantl[es
a family's] binding relations one beaten body at a time," and as an internal, familial
terrorism that constitutes "the most abjectly unfaithful act of all." Id. The act of "unkinning" in the context of the psychopathology exhibited by some African American
families within the United States, involving "a mythologized male authority figure
invested with powers to punish" who has been "[o]ften brutalized himself - by older black
men and fathers ... or by the white society that makes his brutality necessary and
convenient, even useful, perhaps;" and adding that such an individual's "domestic
terrorism has not made him, amazingly enough, an unloved character within black
culture."
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Such a
possibility, creativity, contribution, and strength.
horribly
world
and
realm
is
of
a
young
person's
domination
consequential for African American parents.
This governmental interference with the parent's right to rear
their children cannot have any compelling governmental reason.
This is especially true, given the hybrid rights that are being
violated when police search and seize on the basis of race: the
Fourth Amendment right to be let alone and the Fourteenth
Amendment right rear one's children free from governmental
interference.
African American children, particularly those raised in areas
considered "high crime," live lives closer to those children in wartorn societies than "first world citizens," who posess the
luxurious batting of privilege and membership. "Living in a war
zone means living with danger, the chronic threat of violent
62
assault that is not a function of who you are as an individual."1
"You are in jeopardy just because you are who you are when you
happen to be the wrong person in the wrong place at the wrong
time - all of the time."16 3 Such pervasive and unending danger
undermines the child's psychological and emotional well-being.
C. Impotent We
[W]e may perceive [her] defensive response to [her] situation
as a direct expression of [her] defect, and then see both
defect and response as just retribution for something [her] or
[her] parents or [her] tribe did, and hence a justification of

the way we treat [her] ...

164

It is a shame that children are forced to witness their parents,
humbled and humiliated. Certainly, no healthy parent wants
their children to experience such shame and its scarring effects.
When these children are confronted with others who look like
them, ambivalence and often, abhorrence rushes into the union:
[A] person who wishes to conceal his disability will notice
in
another
person.
mannerisms
disability-revealing
162 GARBARINO ET AL, supra note 144, at 13 (analyzing the environment of fear and
violence resulting from violent conflict, and the effect that such an environment has on
children living within it).
163 Id.
164 GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 6 (explaining the concept of "tribal stigma").
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Moreover, he is likely to resent those mannerisms that
advertise the fact of disability, for in wishing to conceal his
disability he wishes others to conceal theirs. Thus it is that
the person who is hard of hearing and who strives to hide this
fact will be annoyed at the old woman who cups her hand
behind her ear. Flaunting disability is a threat to him
because it stirs up the guilt of having scorned his own group
membership as well as the possibility of his own exposure.
He may prefer surreptitiously to realize the other person's
secret and to maintain a gentlemen's agreement that both
should play their 'as if roles to having the other person
165
challenge his pretense by confiding his own.
What this race-based official dynamic teaches the child is
multi-fold: (1) there is something and someone walking the face
of this planet greater than my parent, (2) this thing is an official
being and my parent cannot challenge it, (3) my parent must be
deficient, as s/he cannot deal with the affront by the stranger,
and (4) the essence of my being is inferior; might makes right.
When the authorities police based on race, they telegraph to their
victims, their community, and the world that African Americans
are required to behave only in ways authorized by the police and,
even then, may be subject to random checks upon their rights of
association, ambulation, etc. 166 The rise of race-based policing
and its increasingly routine rabidity is in response to a resented,
yet increased, visibility of African American social and economic
mobility, which may indicate the possibility of inclusion, equality,
and ultimate superiority.167
As in child-rearing, when slavers physically abused slaves,
they often did so due to emotion rather than for pedagogical
purpose. 16 8 Such unprovoked, horrific, and humiliating violence
was a part of the seasoning of able-bodied adults - and
sometimes proud children - into a life of servitude.
165 GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 86.
166 Ifill, supra note 23, at 280 (noting that "[iln essence, lynchings were used as a tool
to punish any form of black behavior that threatened white supremacy," and that the
lynchings "identified and marked the parameters of black citizenship and freedom").
167 Id. (noting that "lynching became.., an increasingly routine response to black
attempts at education, personal and communal government, suffrage, and other
indicators of cultural inclusion and equality").
168

See generally AUGUST MEIER AND BILL RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO

59-60 (Hill and Wang 1970) (noting that killing a slave was seldom regarded as murder
and that conviction for maltreatment of slaves was extremely rare).
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Similarly, race-based policing has a comparable purpose. Like
lynchings of African Americans,16 9 race-based policing "rights" a
disturbed society's racial and social order, via the law
enforcement officer.
The African American is effectively
regulated to the locations and behaviors designated as fitting and
proper for their seemingly intractable status as American
"Untermenschen."
The awareness of inferiority means that one cannot keep out of
consciousness the formulation of some chronic feeling of the
worst sort of insecurity, meaning that one suffers anxiety and
perhaps even something worse, if jealousy is really worse than
anxiety. The fear that others can disrespect a person based on
race creates insecurity in her contact with other people; this
insecurity arises, not from mysterious and somewhat disguised
sources, but from something which she knows she cannot fix.
This effect represents an almost fatal deficiency of the selfsystem. The self is unable to disguise or exclude a definite
formulation that reads, "[I] am inferior. Therefore people will
dislike me and I cannot be secure with them."170 Learning
repression to survive prepares a child to be dysfunctional:1 71
[t]he central feature of the stigmatized individual's situation
in life can now be stated. It is a question of what is often, if
vaguely, called 'acceptance.' Those who have dealings with
[her] fail to accord [her] the respect and regard which the
uncontaminated aspects of [her] social identity have led
them to anticipate extending, and have led [her]
to
anticipate receiving; [T]he echoes this denial by finding that
some of [her] own attributes warrant it.172
"In a situation of unequal power, a subordinate group has to
focus on survival.
It becomes very important for the
subordinates to become highly attuned to the dominant as a way
of protecting themselves from them."173 However, excessive focus
may be just as costly as too little focus, too much focus leaves
169 Ifill, supra note 23, at 279-80 (stating that "Lynching was designed to send
messages to the black community about how to behave, about whom to associate with,
about whether blacks should vote, serve in the armed forces, make a living, be
independent, or have dignity.").
170 GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 13.
171 HOOKS, supra note 13, at 188.
172 GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 8-9.
173 TATUM, supra note 20, at 25.
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nothing for self-care, advancement, and health; moreover, too
much focus requires exposure to and adoption of negative
stereotypes of the individual's group.17 4 Too little focus may
prove suicidal. Either way, instead of being guided by parental
authority, the child pays most attention to those who clearly
75
control the outcomes, irrespective of parents.1
VI. THE HYBRID'S HYBRID: REVIEWING RACE-BASED POLICING'S
SUBVERSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARENT

Race-based policing in the presence of African American
children cannot be justified by the state under its competing
interests of crime control and law enforcement. Although the
government can remove a child from the custody of her parents
or sever that parental right when a child's safety is at risk, under
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause, the
state must demonstrate that the child's safety is at risk (via
abuse or neglect) by clear and convincing evidence. 176 In these
cases, the parental right is not absolute; the child also has a
liberty interest at stake and the government's parens patriae
interest is implicated in such situations.
With the erosion of the traditional American nuclear family
and the proliferation of single-parent homes, which may allow
children to become more vulnerable to outside authority and
influence, the context in which race-based policing occurs is even
African American children have been
more pernicious.
vulnerable due to the 21st century overseer mentality of those
officials (government and otherwise) who are often in close
contact and quarters with the child. The damage heaped upon
them by the police is especially troubling when it appears that
the goal might be to "season" with fear and deference rather than
177
prevent crime.
174 See id. at 26 (asserting that "the negative messages of the dominant group about
the subordinates may be internalized, leading to self-doubt or, in its extreme form, selfhate").
175 See generally id. at 25-26 (discussing the child's view towards authority).
176 See Santofsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-71 (1982) (holding that "[a clear and
convincing evidence standard] adequately conveys to the fact finder the level of subjective
certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process").
177 A recent example of such a tactic occurred in St. Louis, Missouri, when charter
school principal Sam Morgan, a former Department of Corrections employee, directed
police to handcuff a kindergarten boy, place him in the back of a police cruiser, and drive
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Also troubling is the undermining effect that race-based
policing has on intact, two-parent families.178 A young child
needs to believe that his/her parents are omnipotent. This belief
is destroyed with what the child is forced to learn at the hands of
law enforcement when police are physically and - in the child's
mind - apparently appropriately able to discipline the child's
parent(s) in ways humiliating and terrifying.
Parents'
vulnerability will only exacerbate the child's and make this police
treatment more memorable and believable.17 9
When African American children are the targets or witnesses
of race-based policing the child as a heretofore unspoiled bit of
human experience is sullied against the parental will. Recently,
there has been at least one occasion where the notion of
"Parenting While Black" has been litigated, both under the
Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Specifically, in
Jackson v. Griffin,18o parents of an African American son filed
suit, claiming they were denied their fundamental right to
parent, which constituted a denial of Equal Protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They argues that
they were "made to appear powerless to protect their son.., from
wrongful, discriminatory conduct.. ." inflicted by the police.'18 In
Jackson, the police knowingly affected an unlawful arrest of their
son.
Afterwards they fingerprinted, photographed, violently
searched, detained for three days, and placed him in a criminal
lineup,' 8 2 despite their knowledge that others were the actual
suspects sought for an armed robbery.18 3 Darryl's parents twice
went to the police station to free their son and regain custody of

him "around the block." According to all accounts, the child's mother never approved of or
assented to such a tactic for her child. See Cheryl Wittenauer, Handcuffed Boy Lands
Principal on Leave, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER.COM, at http://springfield.newsleader.comlnews/_archive/1216-Handcuffed-252427.html (last visited on Dec. 23, 2004).
178 See, e.g., ELLIS COSE, RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (Harper Collins Publishers,
Inc. 1993) (providing examples of such individuals and their experiences with race-based
policing). See generally JOE FEAGIN AND MELVIN SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK
MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE (Boston, Beacon Press 1994).
179 See generally BRAZELTON & SPARROW, supra note 4, at 349 (discussing a parent's
job of raising children free of racism).
180 No. 85-C6852, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24504 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 6, 1986).
181 Id. at *4.
182 Id. at *2-5 (discussing the process of the arrest).
183 Id. at *2-3 (noting the absence of a good faith mistake).
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him from the police.I8 4 They were unsuccessful; the police
continued to hold him unlawfully. 185
Among other causes of actions, the parents' lawsuit against the
state alleged that their son's arrest violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.186
Specifically, the lawsuit alleges that:
conduct of the police officers was designed to and did
intentionally inflict mental and emotional anguish on [the
parents] because of their race and color... [and they] were
made to appear powerless to protect their son ... from
wrongful, discriminatory conduct visited on him by the police
officers because of [the son's] race and color... that the
conduct of the police officers was intended to and did deprive
[the parents] of equal protection of the laws; and ... that as
a result of the conduct of the police officers, [the parents] ...
comfort of their son 187
were deprived of the society and
88
[because of their race and color].1
According to the parents, the Chicago police treated them
differently than they would have towards white parents whose
minor child was arrested.1 8 9 These causes of actions were joined,
given that Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but
does provide remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.190
Strikingly, even after the City of Chicago's motion to dismiss
was denied, the appellate court seemed to require parents to be
184 Id. at *2-4 (discussing the parents' attempts to regain custody of their son).
185 Id. at *3-4 (noting the unlawfulness of the custody).
186 See id. at *4 (discussing the claims brought against the police). See generally 42
U.S.C. § 1983 providing that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...
Id.
187 Jackson, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24504, at *4-5 (summarizing the four allegations
Fred and Juanita Jackson brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count III).
188 See id. at *6 (explaining that the parents felt they suffered a constitutional
deprivation because the police deprived them of the society and comfort of their son based
on their color and race).
189 Id. (noting that an action concerns "how parents are treated when they attempt to
help their child," as their parental rights were frustrated by this race-based policing).
190 See id. n.6 (clarifying that the racially motivated conduct of the police was not in
violation of § 1983 because § 1983 does not create substantive rights).
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"active participants in the action surrounding" 19 1 race-based
treatment of their children, implying that the parents must
actively assert and attempt to protect their fundamental right to
parent, rather than presuming it applies when the prerequisite of
192
children triggers the right.
Parallels can be drawn between the current governmental
disrespect of the rights for parents of African American children
and the system and results that occurred during American
slavery. 193 African American parents do not bargain for such
governmental violations of their right to rear their children in
the manner in which the parents choose. Parents typically want
to rear their children (and the Constitution is read to affirm their
desire) with as little governmental interference as possible.
African American parents did not bargain for this minimal slice
of citizenry; yet, their fundamental ability to parent successful
Americans and healthy citizens of the world becomes, at best,
compromised if not destroyed.
Moreover, when law enforcement police African American
children based on their perception that they are "solving the
problem" at the root by instilling fear and deference, the need to
"kill the problem" demands more annihilatory measures given
There is no
the desire never to come this way again.
understanding that such children will ever grow into Americans
who are, by definition, wonderfully worthy by birthright; rather,
the understanding is that African American children are a
regrettable pox on society that disrupts healthy American life
while also exploding the criminal pandemic. There is no motive
to moderate, no perception of possibility in the entity other than
rampant, pernicious, unrepentant criminality.
191 Id. at *19 (specifying that the Jackson holding does not permit all parents whose
minor children are wrongfully arrested to bring § 1983 claims and emphasizing that the
Jackson case involves parents who were actively involved in their son's arrest).
192 See id. at *19-20 (holding that "when the parents are targets of intentional and
racially-motivated discrimination which deprives them of federally protected fundamental
rights, and when the actions are taken under color of state law, then the allegation will be
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss"); id. (highlighting facts, such as the Jacksons'
active participation in the actions surrounding their son's arrest, the racially-motivated
conduct of the police officers which "thwarted" the Jacksons' attempts to free their son,
and the Jacksons' deprivation of the care, custody, management, and control of their son,
that led the court to deny the defendants' motion).
193 See id. at *18 ('The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1978))).
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When police infringe upon an individual's right to be let alone,
his right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and his
right to parent his child free from governmental interference,
such governmental action implicates at least two and, arguably
all three types of constitutional protection. Consequently, such
governmental action - especially if predicated and initiated on
the insidious use of race - merits increased constitutional
protection and - this article argues - heightened scrutiny and
judicial review.
The Supreme Court has recognized the "hybrid right," which
requires increased constitutional protection for conduct that
implicates more than one constitutional right.194 Given the
history of policing and law enforcement toward African
Americans, it is befitting the status of African American demicitizens to benefit from such a right as well as the heightened
level of judicial review require. To the extent that race-based
policing occurs in the presence of or on African American
children, the Court should apply the heightened scrutiny
applicable when two constitutional rights are implicated.
CONCLUSION

Police do have an enormous impact on our society, particularly
young children and teens. Police visit schools and indoctrinate
children with the character of "Officer Friendly," the official
representative of law enforcement who purports to be your friend
and societal savior. Police also take advantage of their societal
status and gain prominent entry into various locations where
children are present. In those locations, police often are on their
best and most politically correct behavior.
Parents must constantly deal with the world showing their
children that life is not fair, kind, or merciful. What makes the
crucial difference here is that such a message comes at the hands
194 See Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338 (D. Md. 1999) (citing Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972)). In Yoder, the Supreme Court overturned a lower
court's convictions of Amish parents who removed their children from public school,
despite a state law requiring compulsory attendance until the age of sixteen. Yoder, 406
U.S. at 232. As the parents' rights involved both their Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest in parenting, as well as their First Amendment right to free exercise of their
chosen religion, the Court deemed the right "fundamental" and reviewed the state's action
under a strict scrutiny standard, creating a "hybrid" constitutional protection for the
conduct at issue. Id. at 232.
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of the government and is based on an immutable trait of those
subjected to the hostility. Imagine what goes through the child's
mind when, in a later context and location, that same Officer
Friendly or one or more of his associates treat that child's
parents and loved ones as presumed criminals, dangerous on the
face of their melanin? The child becomes scarred, both with
regard to his self image, that of his adult caretakers, and of those
who look like him.
. "[W]hat war is really about is destroying people." 19 5 This is
most true of our modern brand of wars than what has come to be
regarded as conventional wars. "The situation sounds
melodramatic to be sure. But war zones convert the stuff of
melodrama into reality." 19 6 What seems to matter is that the
learned knowledge on the part of the child who has witnessed or
been a victim of race-based policing is that it or worse could
happen not merely as a remote possibility as being struck by
lightning or hit by a meteor; rather, as a frequently recurring
event that is sure to occur again and against which there is no
protection. In essence, for the child so exposed, race-based
policing becomes not a matter of if, but when, each time it is
actually or nearly experienced.197
Perhaps the old adage that African Americans have proffered
to their progeny over the ages still rings true. Despite the
acknowledged gains that had resulted from a more socially
sensitized judiciary toward the enforced vagaries of African
American life at the hands of race-based institutions, it seems
still apt to warn this group of Americans - and all those who live,
love, travel, and associate with them - that they must continue
to exert twice as much effort to get half as far. Perhaps asserting
the denial and infringement of two to three constitutional rights
when police actions under the Fourth Amendment are race-based
and occurs on or in the presence of African American children
may finally serve to raise one or more judicial eyebrows and
allow Blacks to wrest an important, additional sliver of the

195
196
197
bullets

GARBARINO ET AL, supra note 144, at 7.
id. at 6.
Id. at 7 ("What good are the days and maybe even weeks when there are no real
in the air but bullets continue to exist in the imagination fed by memoryT').
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birthright of their citizenship that White Americans enjoy
98
without ever facing such a challenge.1

198 But see Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001). The court upheld
pretextual seizure and arrest where probable cause existed for seatbelt violations. In
Atwater, the defendant had her children in the car with her when she was seized for a
traffic violation and arrested. See id. Although the defendant argued the
unreasonableness of the officer's conduct, particularly in the presence of her children, she
did not argue the Fourteenth Amendment right to parent was violated by the alleged
trauma inflicted upon her children by this governmental agent. Id. at 370 (O'Connor J.,
dissenting).

